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Copy 8 of 8

5 May 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Special Activities

SUBJECT: Tactical Evaluation Report


The attached report is forwarded for your review and
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Deputy for Operations, OSA

Attachment:
Tactical Evaluation Report



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
OPERATION SCOPE SAINT II

TACTICAL EVALUATION REPORT

ON

DETACHMENT G EDWARDS AFB, CALIFORNIA

14 THROUGH 17 APRIL 1969



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TACTICAL EVALUATION REPORT

1. Purpose: To evaluate Detachment G's capability to deploy and operate the U-2R aircraft.
2. Place(s) of Evaluation: Edwards AFB, California, Loring AFB, Maine, and
3. Dates of Evaluation: 14 - 17 April 1969.

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5. Overall Evaluation: Detachment G's performance in deploying and in operating the U-2R is considered outstanding. However, in the strict sense of this tactical evaluation, the unit was rated unsatisfactory because of its inability to launch the scheduled simulated operational mission on 18 April (due to ground damage to the U-2R the night of 17 April).

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6. Major Limiting Factors: The failure of the deploying Detachment to take the necessary precautions for protecting the aircraft from being damaged in a ground accident was the major and only limiting factor. This alone prevented the Detachment from receiving a satisfactory report by the Evaluation Team. The fact that the deploying personnel had been awake for a considerable period of time may be contributed greatly to the lack of success on this operation.

7. Specific Comments on Major Staff Functions:

A. Command, Control and Supervision:

(1) Overall Evaluation: Unsatisfactory.

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- (2) Major Limiting Factors: It is believed that more supervisory control of the immediate area around the aircraft on the ground could have possibly prevented damage to the aircraft.
- (3) Significant Observations:
 - (a) The Detachment's command personnel exhibited thorough understanding and knowledge of the pertinent Hqs Directives, the Hqs Operations Plans, the Hqs Operations Order (and Annexes). The Staff's use of these Hqs Directives as well as the appropriate Detachment SOPs and check list to organize and manage this deployment was exacting, thorough and performed in a professional manner. These Forms, Directives, SOPs, etc. were examined and found to be current with the latest changes, revisions, deletions included.
 - (b) The briefings given by the Detachment Staff to the Detachment personnel and support airlift crews were thorough and complete in all respects.
 - (c) It was apparent that the Detachment had readily available detailed check lists; however, aircraft security check lists were not available or used. The in being check lists were used by the person responsible for completing the action required. The supervisor of that particular section would perform a follow-up inspection of the actions taken, and he too would initial the form.

B. Operations:

- (1) Overall Evaluation: Satisfactory.
- (2) Major Limiting Factors: None.
- (3) Significant Observations:
 - (a) The operations staff members of the Detachment (both at home station and on the deployment) were thoroughly knowledgeable of their assigned functions and tasks. Their use of SOPs check lists and other pertinent directives was satisfactory in all respects.

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
- (b) After the departure of the C-141 at 1200L 15 April, Detachment G operations continued with routine operations i. e. , four training sorties which included three "R" model sorties and one "G" model sortie.
- (c) Detachment G operations adequately demonstrated their ability to cope with the unexpected by taking the appropriate and timely action when Article 348 (on a local training flight) declared an airborne emergency.
- (d) The change in drivers on the SCOPE SAINT II deployment during the morning of 16 April was effected in a very smooth and orderly manner. The pilots' briefing for the deployment was held on schedule by [REDACTED] This briefing was thorough and complete and the briefing personnel utilized adequate check lists.

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C. Security:

- (1) Overall Evaluation: The security procedures which were implemented during the deployment of SCOPE SAINT II were found to be satisfactory in every respect.
- (2) Major Limiting Factors: None.
- (3) Significant Observations:
 - (a) The security briefings of both Detachment G personnel and the C-141 crew covered all significant security and cover aspects of the deployment.

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- (d) Three hours after the arrival at [] a Security Assistant couriered simulated take to Wiesbaden aboard a USAF T-39.
- (e) Due to a combination of factors, a forklift driven by a Navy enlisted man severely damaged the article. A review of security procedures was initiated with emphasis on control of personnel and vehicles in the vicinity of the aircraft.
- (4) Summary: Detachment G Security Staff demonstrated the capability to perform on a deployment in a highly professional manner, not only in their security speciality but also in a number of additional duties. Recommendations concerning deployment procedures of security significance will be made by separate memorandum.

D. Materiel:

- (1) Overall Evaluation: Satisfactory.
 - (a) The organization demonstrated an Outstanding capability to accomplish its assigned materiel mission.
 - (b) Materiel planning and implementation of support functions was accomplished in an Outstanding manner.
 - (c) Maintenance check lists and timing schedules ("Countdown Procedures") in use by the organization were considered Excellent.
- (2) Major Limiting Factors: None.
- (3) Significant Observations:
 - (a) The SCOPE SAINT II briefing given to the Tac-Eval Team was a duplicate of that given to Detachment G deployment personnel. It was an Excellent briefing and covered all aspects of the deployment in considerable detail.

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- (b) A detailed review of Detachment G check lists, "countdown" procedures and deployment directives was performed. Revised editions were being printed (essentially, to update certain portions) and these were considered Excellent.
 - (c) Considerable effort had been made to insure loading of the C-141 would be within cube and weight limitations, as well as positioning of items to the established priority of unloading/utilization. The Detachment performed an Outstanding feat in planning and assembling a compact, air-transportable load.
 - (d) The program of reducing outsized AGE, such as carts and handling equipment, to collapsible, mobile proportions is paying dividends. An example being the "Tinker-Toy" piece of AGE which was employed during this deployment.
 - (e) Each individual on the deployment had been assigned a number of functions to perform that were aside from his specialty and which were based on the need of the moment. For example, it was not unusual to observe a Lockheed Maintenance Specialist participate in the unloading of baggage, drive a jeep, assist the Photo or Commo people, etc. The deploying cadre demonstrated superb team spirit and cohesiveness.
- (4) Summary: Detachment G has been instrumental in the attainment of a major milestone in U-2R deployment concepts and has demonstrated it is capable of performing its assigned missions to the extent displayed during SCOPE SAINT II.

E. Communications:

- (1) Overall Evaluation: Satisfactory.
- (2) Major Limiting Factors: None.

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(3) Significant Observations:

- (a) Detachment G: Preparation and advance planning, as observed up to the time of launch of C-141, was well conceived and efficiently executed. All personnel know their jobs and the overall coordination and direction within the Commo team was excellent. Planning for the loading of the C-141, to enable rapid downloading at Loring, or any other Article abort recovery base, was extremely well done. Message traffic flow and delivery and handling arrangements were uniformly good. Overall evaluation of operation as observed at Detachment G - Satisfactory.
- (b) Loring: Upon landing at Loring, the Commo team downloaded the necessary equipment and moved it to the selected operating area with a minimum of wasted effort. Again, every team member obviously knew exactly what he was to do and the equipment was unpacked, assembled and placed in operation smoothly. The fact that an off-line circuit, via acoustical coupler and Autovon, was established with Headquarters within one hour after arrival attests to the efficiency with which advance planning was done. Discrepancies in the contents of the packages were extremely minor and did not affect the overall operation. Message traffic flow, considering the necessity for off-line encipherment, was well within acceptable limits. Test messages sent via common user channels were satisfactorily handled. Disassembly, handling, and loading of the packages was smoothly handled. Overall evaluation of operation as observed at Loring - Satisfactory.
- (c) [] The arrangements for hook-up at prescribed rendezvous point were satisfactory as were UHF communications with Article. HF communications [] readout on the C-141 were satisfactory and Detachment G obviously did well in choosing and clearing enroute HF frequencies. Overall evaluation of [] Satisfactory. 25X1A

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- (d) [] Again, the team performed extremely well in downloading equipment; moving it to selected operating site, and establishing communications. Some transportation difficulties were encountered but these posed no insurmountable problem. On-line communication was established [] approximately 2.5 hours after arrival. Some difficulties with equipment, not yet clearly identified, were initially encountered and these sporadically persisted but did not affect the overall message traffic flow. Back-up communications via common user channels [] were considered acceptable. The Tactical Evaluation was discontinued prior to the mounting of a simulated operations mission. Overall evaluation of operation as observed at [] Satisfactory.

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(4) Recommendations:

- (a) That a more readily accessible variety of small tools, a.c. power plugs/adaptors, etc., be loaded with the kits.
- (b) That some means of screening and access control be devised in order to provide a greater degree of privacy of cryptographic operations.
- (c) That, where time permits, one suitably qualified communications officer proceed by the fastest means available to the deployment site, in advance of the support aircraft - particularly where leased lines are to be used - to coordinate arrangements and to assure that lines, power, telephones are installed and working, that security and privacy arrangements are adequate, and that appropriately located antenna sites are readily available.
- (d) While clearly recognizing that it is a goal not to be easily achieved, it is recommended that the combining of team member functions be considered a desirable target. An example of such combining would be an

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Electronics Technician/Radio who is also well qualified as a [] operator or, alternatively, 25X1A who is cross trained and well qualified as a cryptographic technician.

F. Life Support:

- (1) Overall Evaluation: Satisfactory.
- (2) Major Limiting Factors: None.
- (3) Significant Observations: The Detachment's Life Support staff had a thorough and complete understanding of their assigned tasks and functions. This staff had and used detailed check lists and procedures for every portion of this deployment.

8. Conclusions: Detachment G demonstrated that they are capable of deploying and operating the new U-2R aircraft. The Detachment personnel performed their assigned tasks in an Outstanding manner, with the exception of taking the proper supervisory precautions that would have prevented the aircraft from being damaged. It is believed that the lack of sleep over the period from Loring to the time of the accident, coupled with the many detailed tasks required to get the Detachment in place and operating, was the most significant contributory cause in this breakdown of proper supervisory control.

9. Recommendations:

- A. The requirements for deploying the support aircraft simultaneously with the U-2 should be re-examined.
- B. Detachment G should review its procedures (formal and informal) that govern the access of personnel to the U-2 aircraft, the special systems, and the general overall deployed site.

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COMMENTS/ CONCURRENCE

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SAS/O/OSA [redacted] v (2 May 1969)

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

TACTICAL EVALUATION REPORT 14 - 17 April 1969

FROM:

EXTENSION

NO.

C/SAS/O/OSA

228

IDEA 0436-69

DATE

5 May 1969

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

D/OPS

5 May 69

S

Signature

2.

D/M

6 May

1/1

Comments/Concurrence

3.

S/S

5 May

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EO/OSA

5/6/69

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Information

5.

DD/SA

6 May

1/1

Comments/Concurrence

6.

D/SA

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Comments/Concurrence

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